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Last updated December 2025

Basics

Work

  • 2024 - Present
    Research Assistant to Prof. Jean-Francois Houde
    University of Wisconsin-Madison
  • 2022 - Present
    External Academic Consultant
    Bank of Canada
  • 2021 - 2022
    Analyst
    Bank of Canada
  • 2018 - 2021
    Research Assistant
    Bank of Canada

Education

  • 2022 - Present

    Madison, WI

    PhD
    University of Wisconsin-Madison
    Economics & Finance
  • 2021 - 2022

    Austin, TX

    MS
    University of Texas at Austin
    Data Science
  • 2014 - 2018

    Toronto, ON

    BA Hons.
    University of Toronto
    Economics

Awards

  • 2025
    Best Third Year Finance Research Paper Scholarship
    University of Wisconsin-Madison
  • 2024, 2025
    Juli Plant Grainger Summer Research Fellowship
    University of Wisconsin-Madison
  • 2022 - 2026
    Doctoral Fellowship
    Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
  • 2020
    Women in Economics Scholarship
    Bank of Canada
  • 2018
    Best Undergraduate Paper
    Canadian Economics Association
  • 2017
    President's Scholar Program Scholarship
    University of Toronto

Publications

  • 2025
    Adverse Selection and Learning in Consumer Credit Market
    Working Paper
    This paper highlights a trade-off in credit markets between regulatory safeguards for informed consent and the informational frictions they can amplify. We find that requiring banks to garner explicit consent prior to raising clients' credit limits induces disproportionately higher take-up among riskier borrowers, worsening the risk profile of accounts receiving limit increases relative to the pre-policy regime. In response, we find banks decreased the size of the average credit limit increase and simultaneously gave more frequent limit increases. We develop a precautionary savings model with endogenous credit limits to study the role of learning and adverse selection in markets with incomplete information. We show that learning from acceptance decisions can rationalize our empirical results. Our model suggests that requiring consumer consent reduced lender profits but had negligible effects for consumers. Our key counterfactual demonstrates that lowering lender patience while requiring consumer consent would decrease both the frequency and size of limit increases.

Skills

Coding
Python
Julia
Stata
Matlab
R
HTML/CSS
Computing
Azure
AWS
Slurm-based HPCs
Data
Web-scraping
Modeling
Simulation

Languages

English
Native
Mandarin
Native
French
Fluent
German
Beginner